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The Clean Power Plan (CPP) is the crowning environmental achievement of the
Obama presidency, but a stay of proceedings has prevented the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) from enforcing the rule’s implementation since early 2016.
In February, the Supreme Court suspended the
authority granted to the EPA under the Clean Air Act
to compel states’ preliminary CPP compliance. This
action grants courts the necessary time to resolve legal
challenges related to the new rule before any earlystage EPA enforcement efforts could de facto nullify
a negative judgment against CPP implementation,
which could be handed down in the coming months.1
Presuming the EPA eventually will be able to move
forward with the CPP—which is not guaranteed
given the unprecedented scope of regulatory authority
the agency is assuming—the conversation about the
plan will return to the question of economic viability.
In short, what will be the CPP’s effect on long-term
energy prices in the United States?
Although the federal government is seeking to
address carbon pollution from power plants by setting
a national goal for reduced CO2 emissions from fossil
fuel-fired and natural gas-fired plants, each state must
meet its own individual target for emissions reduction
by 2030, with interim requirements each year between
2022-2029. On the surface, the absence of a single,
national CO2 market for trading emission allowances
would suggest that implementing the CPP on a stateby-state basis would lead to inefficiencies in curbing

SUMMARY
• This brief looks at the costs of implementing the EPA’s Clean
Power Plan. Specifically, it examines whether implementing
the CPP on a state-by-state basis—that is, with each state
meeting its own individual target for emissions reduction by
2030, rather than establishing regional targets—is economically efficient. The answer is yes.
• The economic analysis uses data from electricity-generating
firms participating in the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland
(PJM) Interconnection to examine the relative economic efficiency of regional versus state-by-state implementation of
the CPP.
• Looking at natural gas capacity across regional and stateby-state implementations in 2030, the research shows that
capacity in the state-by-state scenario (70 GW) is about 24%
higher than the capacity in the regional scenario (56 GW). This
translates to reduced CO2 prices in 2030--$27/ton (regional)
and $15/ton (state-by-state).
• The key mechanism is investment. Compared to the regional
scenario, implementing the CPP on a state-by-state basis leads
to higher initial CO2 prices. But those higher prices increase
incentives to invest aggressively in new natural gas capacity,
using the best available technology in terms of emissions
and efficiency. This, in turn, leads to an overall decrease in
wholesale electricity prices—in fact, the research indicates
that state-by-state implementation would yield the lowest
electricity prices in 2030.
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mentation. Our preliminary findings
were remarkable. By 2022—the first
year of interim benchmarks—regional
implementation leads to electricity
prices of 5.7 cents/kWh, while stateby-state implementation results in
prices of 8.6 cents/kWh. However, by
2030, electricity prices are 5.8 cents/
kWh regionally versus 4.6 cents/kWh
in a state-by-state scenario. This Issue
Brief highlights how investment, in
implicitly coordinating separate state
CO2 markets, is the main mechanism
for our findings.3

emissions (and it definitely leads
to higher initial CO2 prices), thus
increasing the economic cost of the
CPP. But we offer two considerations.
First, the existence of a single market
for wholesale electricity mitigates the
potential negative effects of separate
state-level CO2 markets. Individual
firms will make optimal new power
plant investment decisions based on
the distribution of production and
CO2 prices across state markets,
implicitly coordinating them in the
process. Second, we simulate a model
that shows that electricity prices
can actually be lower by 2030 when
implementation occurs state-by-state
instead of regionally.
The model takes advantage of rich
energy production data from electricity-generating firms participating in
the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) Interconnection, which
operates the country’s largest wholesale electricity market as the regional
transmission organization (RTO) for
13 states across 20 zones.2 By utilizing PJM as an example of a viable
cohort of states that, under the new
rule, could aggregate their individual
emission targets and implement the
CPP at a regional-level, we examined
the relative economic efficiency of
regional versus state-by-state imple-

BACKGROUND
On October 23, 2015, the EPA
published the Clean Power Plan
Final Rule in the Federal Register
after receiving and incorporating 4.3
million comments on the original
proposed rule.4 The CPP, though a
federal plan, establishes state-level
targets for cutting carbon emissions
from the nation’s largest polluter—
power plants.5 When aggregated, the
individual state targets add up to the
national goal: a 32 percent reduction
in carbon pollution below 2005 levels
by 2030 (see Figure 1). According
to the EPA, the CPP has expected
climate benefits of $20 billion and
health benefits in the range of $14-

$34 billion. The rule would facilitate
the transition to cleaner, natural gas
energy, promote investment in alternative energy technologies, and provide states the flexibility to meet their
emissions-cutting goals. Ultimately,
the EPA’s chief concern is the federal
32 percent target that, if met, would
constitute an important milestone
in the fight against anthropogenic
climate change.
If the stay of proceedings is lifted,
the EPA will oblige states to submit
unique Implementation Plans for
ensuring that existing power plants
within their jurisdictions achieve both
interim and final CO2 targets. The
rule offers three options for measuring progress and it highlights three
so-called building blocks for meeting
CCP targets based on the best system
of emission reductions (BSER) available for CO2 emitting power plants
(see Table 1). It also allows (but does
not require) states to partner with
other states when implementing
their plans.
The state targets do not apply to
new, modified, or reconstructed plants,
which the EPA instead will regulate
through standards and emissions limitations that are source- or unit-specific. For example, the final rule specifies a natural gas plant limit of 1000

NOTES
1

Some legal experts have suggested that the stay was granted to avoid an outcome similar to Michigan vs. EPA. In that
case from 2015, preliminary clean air compliance measures
– mandated by the EPA – cost states nearly $10 billion in
exchange for only $4 million in direct health benefits before
the Supreme Court ruled that the agency unreasonably
interpreted the Clean Air Act. The Court decided that the EPA
does need to consider costs when it implements regulations.
For more, see Jonathan H. Adler, “Supreme Court puts the
brakes on the EPA’s Clean Power Plan”, The Washington

Post, February 9, 2016.
These thirteen states are Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia,
and Washington, D.C. There are nearly 1,000 electricitygenerating firms that buy, sell, and deliver electricity through
PJM’s spot wholesale market, including ten strategic firms
that participate in the lion’s share of all exchanges and invest
in all of the fuel-specific new capacity.
3 The primary source for this Issue Brief is our working paper:
2

2

Jose Miguel Abito, Christopher R. Knittel, Konstantinos
Metaxoglou, and Andre Trindade (2016), “Separate Markets
for Externalities: Regional versus State-by-State Implementation of the Clean Power Plan”.
4 Technically, the CPP refers both to a set of emissions targets
applied to existing power plants (pursuant to Section 111(d)
of the Clean Air Act) and to rules that are applicable to new
energy sources as part of the “Carbon Pollution Standard for
New Plants” (pursuant to Section 111(b) of the CAA). The
final rule is available here: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
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TABLE 1:

CPP EMPHASIS ON FLEXIBILITY IN MEETING STATEWIDE EMISSIONS
GOALS

Measurement Options for Interim and Final Targets (states choose one):
Option 1 - a rate-based state goal measured in pounds per megawatt hour (lb/MWh)
Option 2 - a mass-based state goal measured in total short tons of CO2
Option 3 - a mass-based state goal with a new source complement measured in total short tons of CO2

Strategies for Reducing Emissions (states can use in any combination):
Building Block 1 - reducing the carbon intensity of electricity generation by improving the heat rate of existing coal-fired
power plants
Building Block 2 - substituting increased electricity generation from lower-emitting existing natural gas plants for reduced
generation from higher-emitting coal-fired power plants
Building Block 3 - substituting increased electricity generation from new zero-emitting renewable energy sources (like wind
and solar) for reduced generation from existing coal-fired power plants
Source: Environmental Protection Agency

lbs of CO2 per MWh, below which
firms will not have to pay for what
they emit. In essence, this requires
them to invest in the latest combined
cycle technology. For coal-fired plants,
the limit is 1400 lbs of CO2 per
MWh, which is currently achievable
only with carbon capture and storage
technology—a technology that is in
its infancy and presently cannot meet
the new standards. The EPA cannot
require energy producing firms to use
explicit technologies, but even the best
new coal-fired plants cannot meet
the new emission limits by design.
Some existing natural gas-fired power

plants, however, do meet these new
standards, leading to a policy question
that remains unresolved, at least from
the perspective of energy producers
(see Policy Implications below).

IMPLEMENTATION
SCENARIOS IN THE PJM VS.
STATE-LEVEL MODEL
Policymakers generally have supported market-based mechanisms
for addressing environmental externalities, such as carbon pollution, but
the problem of coordinating various
jurisdictions can quickly hamper

implementation. Achieving state-level
emissions goals under the CPP will
require efficient implementation of
one or more of the building blocks, as
well as robust emissions trading, likely
in the form of emission allowances,
via (we assume) a perfectly competitive CO2 permit market. Inefficient
implementation could significantly
raise energy prices, which neither
consumers nor policymakers want.
Mitigating potential inefficiencies
caused by state-by-state implementation of the CPP therefore depends on
the ability of firms to reallocate electricity production across states. This
is a complex challenge. States do not
have unlimited capacity for generating
electricity, and there are many firms
striving to make optimal production
and investment decisions in each state.
These capacity limitations prevent
existing plant output from being freely
reallocated across states. However,
output coming from new capacity
investments can be located based on
CO2 prices across states.6
We sought to discover what would
happen to CO2 prices, wholesale
electricity prices, and investment in
new capacity under a number of different scenarios, so we constructed
and estimated a model of electricity
generation and investment for firms

NOTES
FR-2015-10-23/pdf/2015-22842.pdf
According to the EPA, fossil fuel-fired power plants are the
largest source of U.S. CO2 emissions, accounting for 31
percent of total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which
itself is the largest source of pollution (82 percent) in the
country.
6 All else equal, the CO2 price alters the merit order of plants
with different fuel types (coal vs. natural gas), heat and
emission rates, and it increases generating cost. Currently,
since no emissions trading is occurring, the CO2 prices in
5

question are shadow prices, or unofficial firm estimates of
likely CO2 spot market prices.
7 Data sources include EPA, PJM, EIA, FERC, SNL Energy,
Evolution Markets, and other proprietary data. See Abito et
al. (2016) for more information.
8 An argument for this assumption can be found here:
Bushnell, J., S. Holland, J. Hughes, and C. Knittel (2015),
“Strategic Policy Choice in State-Level Regulation: The EPA’s
Clean Power Plan”, NBER Working Paper 21259.
9 Electricity prices rose substantially in the fourth scenario

3

where no new investment was allowed under a regional
implementation.
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FIGURE 1
CO2 TOTAL EMISSIONS & EMISSION RATES BY STATE, 2012
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CO2 FINAL MASS & RATE TARGETS BY STATE, 2030
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participating in the PJM wholesale
market. We assume that all new
investment will be in the current best
available technology (BAT) for coal
and natural gas plants, both because
the CPP mandates this and because
such an investment maximizes firm
profit. The scenarios are as follows:
1. Baseline: Business-as-usual without CPP targets (e.g., courts rule
against the EPA and prohibit CPP
implementation).

KY

MD

NC
(b) rate

2. Regional Implementation: One
PJM-wide carbon market and
CO2 price to achieve a regional
target.
3. State-by-State Implementation:
State-based carbon markets and
CO2 prices to achieve CPP statelevel targets. Under this scenario,
states cannot trade allowances with
other states, even within the same
firm. All state markets are linked
via the PJM wholesale market for
4

electricity, and all markets must
clear simultaneously.
4. Regional Implementation exInvestment: One PJM-wide carbon
market and CO2 price in an
environment with no new investment (assumes coal- and gas-fired
capacity at 2012 levels).
A final note on the model: The
CPP affects supply and investment
decisions (and firm profits) by increasing the cost of generating electricity
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FIGURE 2
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RESULTS AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
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The target CO2 emission rates in the
CPP final rule are either mass-based
(total CO2 short tons) or rate-based
(lbs/MWh). We assume that all states
choose mass-based targets.8 Implementation begins gradually and CO2
emissions decrease each year until
2030, after which time we assume
emissions remain constant. Even
without the CPP, the model predicts
that firms will invest only in new
natural gas capacity and not in coal.
If there is no CPP in 2030, natural gas capacity is just 33 GW, as generation from coal steadily increases
while electricity demand increases
despite no new investment in coal
capacity. Once firms face a positive
CO2 price, generation from coal falls
sharply, especially in the state-bystate scenario.
If the CPP is implemented,
its effects are significantly different, depending on whether there
is regional or state-by-state implementation. Comparing natural gas

Baseline
CPP
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cents/kWh

from fossil fuels and changing the
relative prices of coal and natural gas.
To accurately capture the CPP’s effect
on firms’ decision-making, we needed
to have a rich model of firms’ costs
and how these costs evolve as they add
new capacity. Since firms have different portfolios of plants, with different
efficiency levels, different fuel types,
and different capacities, our model
uses all available data on heat rates,
emission rates and operating and
maintenance costs, thus preserving the
diversity inherent in the industry.7
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capacity across regional and stateby-state implementations in 2030,
capacity in the latter (70 GW ) is
about 24% higher than the capacity in the former (56 GW ). In terms
of 2030 CO2 prices, this translates
to $27/ton (regional) and $15/ton
(state-by-state). As noted earlier, the
initial CO2 price is higher under the
scenario of state-by-state implementation. This increases the incentives
to invest in new natural gas capacity, which reflects the best available
technology in terms of emissions
and efficiency. High CO2 prices
encourage firms to invest much more
aggressively in order to retire old,
inefficient capacity from the merit
order, leading to an overall decrease in
wholesale electricity prices (see Figure
2). Remarkably, electricity prices are
even lower with the state-by-state
implementation compared to the
regional scenario by 2030. As noted
in the opening of this brief, by 2030,
electricity prices are 5.8 cents/kWh
regionally versus 4.6 cents/kWh in a
state-by-state scenario.9

With regional implementation,
BAT capacity accounts for 31% of
total generation by 2030. In contrast, 45% of generation comes from
BAT capacity under state-by-state
implementation. Without CPP, BAT
capacity accounts for less than 6% of
total generation.
Considering the expected public
health and environmental benefits
garnered by a shift towards new BAT
capacity, and noting that the lowest
electricity prices in 2030 come as a
result of state-by-state implementation, there is reason to believe the
Clean Power Plan is economically
beneficial. However, some questions
remain. For instance, there is an ongoing debate about whether the location of new BAT capacity matters, as
different sections of the Clean Air Act
offer conflicting answers. But the primary concern is that existing natural
gas plants that meet the new emissions standards, even if they do not
represent BAT, may be facing artificial
costs under the CPP. This (significant)
subset of “old” yet standard-meeting

6

plants must pay for emissions, according to the final rule, while new plants
will not have to pay for emissions, as
they only have to ensure they emit less
than the new limit. The resolutions to
these questions could still dramatically
alter the final landscape.

CONCLUSION
If the stay on the CPP is lifted and
policymakers refocus their attention on the cost of implementing the
new rule, our research indicates that
state-by-state implementation would
not be a bad alternative to regional
implementation (e.g., a cohort of
PJM Interconnection states) in terms
of wholesale electricity prices (and
therefore CO2 prices in a competitive permit market) and new capacity investment. Because investment
implicitly coordinates separate state
CO2 markets, it is the key to evaluating CPP implementation. Our results
on new BAT investment under the
four implementation scenarios speak
for themselves.
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